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THEME SECTION 
Corporate social responsibility 
and the paradoxes of state capitalism 
Bringing the state back in
Corporate social responsibility and the paradoxes of 
Norwegian state capitalism in the international energy sector
Ståle Knudsen, Dinah Rajak, Siri Lange, and Isabelle Hugøy
Abstract: Th is theme section brings the state back into anthropological studies of 
corporate social responsibility through the lens of Norwegian energy corporations 
working abroad. Th ese transnational corporations (TNCs) are expected by the 
government to act responsibly when “going global.” Yet, we have observed that 
abroad, Norwegian corporations backed by state capital largely operate like any 
other TNCs. We argue that the driver for the adaptation to global capitalism is not 
coming from the embracing of neoliberal policies in Norway, but is rather inherent 
to the ways internationalization of the Norwegian economy is unfolding. To the 
extent that the Norwegian state has an impact on the corporations’ international 
endeavors, it relates primarily to the imperative of managing Norway’s reputation 
as a humanitarian superpower.
Keywords: globalization, governmentality, internationalization, neoliberalism, 
Nordic model, state ownership, transnational corporations
Focusing on the practices and politics of cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR), this theme 
section examines comparatively how transna-
tional companies (TNCs), the state, and the 
world economic order are linked in complex 
ways in energy industries. We study energy cor-
porations because their operations have con-
siderable environmental, social, and economic 
footprints (which CSR policies attempt to mit-
igate), and because states take a particular in-
terest in energy due to its crucial role in society. 
While both proponents and critics of CSR have 
focused on the “business case” for CSR, anthro-
pological debates have stressed how private cor-
porations mobilize the language and practice 
of CSR and sustainability as (neo-liberal) tech-
niques to bypass the state, depoliticize confl icts, 
and take on the role of moral guardians. In the 
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Nordic countries, however, the states have taken 
the lead role in promoting CSR and sustainabil-
ity, and expect Norwegian-based TNCs to act 
responsibly when “going global.” Th e Nordic 
context—where large energy corporations have 
been closely associated with the national proj-
ect, the welfare state, and have signifi cant state 
ownership—challenges conventional thinking 
about public versus private sector agendas and 
disrupt assumptions about how state politics 
and corporate interests interact in the exercise 
of social responsibility.
At the same time, Norwegian energy TNCs 
are intrinsically incorporated into the logics 
and workings of global capitalism, along with 
the modes/norms of transnational corporate 
culture it generates. Norwegian energy corpo-
rations, which to a large extent are state-owned, 
started operating abroad around 1990. Th is was 
a consequence of the opening up of interna-
tional markets as well as deregulation at home 
and a perceived need to internationalize Norwe-
gian state capital. While working far from home, 
these energy corporations relate and adapt to 
local and national particularities in their places 
of operation. At the same time, the standards 
and procedures for CSR or sustainability (as it is 
now more commonly cast within the extractive 
and energy sectors) to which they relate are set 
and managed by international institutions.
Th e contributions in this theme section 
explore ethnographically the performance of 
corporate responsibility by Nordic energy com-
panies. Th ey reveal how the relationship be-
tween transnationalism, state power, and local 
politics plays out in diff erent ways in diverse 
contexts. In this introduction, we contextu-
alize these cases in a broader theoretical and 
historical discussion of the ways debates about 
social responsibility are shaped by the com-
peting forces of global political economy, state 
ownership, and national interest. We explore 
the relationship between transnational corpo-
rate capitalism and the Nordic Model of welfare 
capitalism, between global diversifi cation and 
notions about Norway as the “humanitarian 
superpower.” We chart the importance of state 
ownership in the energy sector, with a particu-
lar focus on the development of the Norwegian 
oil and gas corporation Equinor and the hydro-
power corporation Statkraft  and their respective 
relations with the state.
It is conventional wisdom and theoretical 
assumption that the Nordic model informs a 
better kind of global capitalism. Bringing eth-
nographic insights from a range of geographic 
contexts, this collection questions to what extent 
the Nordic model actually travels with corpora-
tions when they operate abroad, even when the 
corporations are wholly or partly state-owned. 
Th ere are good reasons for this, particularly 
when we consider what it takes for a corporation 
to succeed internationally. Rather than a policy 
shift  toward neoliberalism, internationaliza-
tion has been the main driver for determining 
how Nordic corporations manage CSR. Just as 
the Norwegian state has worked to establish its 
status as a “humanitarian superpower” within 
the so-called global community, so Nordic en-
ergy companies sometimes deploy the “Nordic 
model” as a resource in their operations and 
interactions abroad. Such self-representations 
are mobilized as part of corporate narratives 
of sustainability and responsibility, which in 
themselves constitute key discursive assets in 
securing national contracts and social consent 
to land and resources overseas. But they are a 
double-edged sword, at the sharp end of which 
companies oft en fi nd themselves when they are 
held to account for failing to meet the very stan-
dards they claim to export.
In the theoretical discussion that follows, we 
outline two signifi cant moves beyond the cur-
rent state of anthropological studies of CSR. 
First, we resituate the state (which has remained 
a missing piece of the puzzle when it comes to 
critical analyses of CSR) as central to our under-
standing of what CSR does both for companies 
themselves and its target publics (whether lo-
cal communities, employees, “host” or “home” 
governments). We argue positioning the politics 
of the state as key to the unfolding policy land-
scape of CSR results in richer and more accurate 
analysis of both the intended and unintended 
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outcomes of CSR practice. Second, we do not 
assume that the variegated practices of CSR 
can be fully understood as (purely) neoliberal 
governance techniques. Th is becomes evident 
when we account for how CSR is performed 
in the Nordic context. Our approach takes into 
account global political economy and histori-
cizes the relationship between state, capital, and 
CSR. Th is expanded, and admittedly ambitious, 
framing enables us to ask: what can we learn 
about the relationship between state, capital, 
and corporate responsibility by studying state-
owned Norwegian energy corporations operat-
ing abroad?
CSR and the state
Th e concept of CSR and the practices that come 
with it have distinctive roots in the business 
environment of the United States. CSR gained 
international popularity during the 1980s and 
1990s, but, like other traveling models, adapted 
to local circumstances. Both proponents and 
critics of CSR have primarily considered CSR 
a business strategy. While proponents have fo-
cused on “proving” the business case for CSR, 
critical studies view CSR as part and parcel of 
the global neoliberal shift  in policies. Th e pu-
tative association of CSR with neoliberalism is 
one of the key reasons why the role of the state 
in relation to CSR has largely remained unseen. 
Th e result has been an oversimplifi ed story 
about CSR as a technique of neoliberal gover-
nance for bypassing or usurping the role of the 
state. Drawing on work emanating from the En-
ergethics project, this collection of articles sets 
out to problematize this stock story and interro-
gate more closely the intersection of CSR, state 
politics, and global capitalism.
Th ere is not scope in this introduction for a 
comprehensive review of the anthropology of 
CSR (see Dolan and Rajak 2016), but it is im-
portant to note that anthropological studies of 
CSR have argued that CSR should be seen as 
a broad, evolving, and fl exible set of practices 
and languages through which businesses vari-
ously attempt to position themselves as ethi-
cal actors. Ethnographic work in this fi eld has 
shown the diverse ways that corporations use 
the language and practice of ethics to contain 
and respond to the various challenges and con-
fl icts generated by their activities. Th is literature 
has explored how CSR policies emerged out of 
corporate accommodation to critiques of their 
environmental and social impacts (and of the 
neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s more 
generally) and evolved into a set of techniques 
through which companies claim to foster local 
sustainable development in direct interaction 
with relevant local communities (Benson and 
Kirsch 2010; Welker 2009).
Th e discourse of CSR has been dynamic and 
adaptive. In recent years, in response to con-
verging crises of the commodity downturn, 
climate change action, and depleting reserves, 
there has been a shift  within the broader energy 
sector from the register of responsibility to an 
emphasis on sustainability and risk manage-
ment in articulating a CSR agenda. At the same 
time this shift  has arguably been in response to 
growing critique of corporate colonial pater-
nalism enacted through CSR (see, e.g., Chong 
2018; Rajak 2011; Welker 2014). To many critics 
and practitioners alike, CSR retained too much 
of the philanthropic tradition it was meant to 
replace, prompting the language to shift  toward 
“sustainability” and “environmental and social 
governance” (ESG). A major claim by business 
and in management theory is that the handling 
of corporate responsibility should be embedded 
or mainstreamed within corporate manage-
ment processes—within the very DNA of the 
company—from geological prospecting, to risk 
assessment, to fi nancial forecasting.
Th e latest shift  in the language of business 
responsibility from CSR to ESG has co-evolved 
with the emergence of an expanding fi eld for 
business ethics constituted by international 
codes, conventions, and consultancy; and the 
extensive machinery for reporting and audit this 
new institutional landscape has generated. While 
CSR primarily developed within a neo-liberal 
(Anglo-American) context, the United States 
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plays a less prominent role in these interna-
tional frameworks, which are more infl uenced 
by other states and actors. Since these inter-
national institutions generally have no power 
over the corporations other than aff ecting their 
reputation, state law and regulations remain the 
primary mechanisms for sanctioning the work 
of TNCs.
However, a key insight from ethnographies 
of corporate ethics is that TNCs increasingly 
bypass the state—both at home and in their 
countries of operation—through local enclav-
ing (Ferguson 2005) or partnership with non-
state actors (Gardner 2012), thereby claiming 
“a kind of collective moral guardianship over 
people,” especially where states are incapable of 
furthering the ideals of development, freedom, 
democracy, and the like (Rajak 2011: 55). Of-
ten, corporations have been seen to “take on the 
role of states” by funding and operating basic 
services, such as, schools, health facilities, and 
transport infrastructure, through CSR pro-
grams. Accordingly, studies of CSR tend to be 
characterized by the absence, rather than the 
presence, of the state.
We re-examine this position, asking whether 
state entities can take an active role in shaping 
the CSR of TNCs, be it in their country of or-
igin or of operation. In the actualized practice 
of CSR, the boundary between the corporation 
and state may be diffi  cult to pinpoint, and CSR 
may be interwoven with other interactions be-
tween the corporation, public authorities, and 
locals (see, e.g., Welker 2014, chap. 2). By of-
fering comparative cases across state-owned 
companies such as Statkraft  on the one hand 
(Knudsen, Müft üoğlu, et al. this issue), and 
on the other, publically listed companies with 
signifi cant state shareholding such as Equinor 
(Lange this issue; Strønen this issue), we raise 
a set of key questions which the articles in this 
thematic section variously address. We ask 
whether in fact, both state-owned and partially 
state-owned energy companies can pursue and 
implement corporate ethics by governance tech-
niques that do not rely on and promote market 
rule, commodifi cation, and privatization as reg-
ulatory frameworks evolve from the focus on 
CSR to ESG. Finally, the articles in this thematic 
section look beyond the actors and institutions 
producing CSR from above (both private and 
governmental), to examine how CSR can be 
claimed “from below.”
Neoliberal globalization and the state
Th e Norwegian case shows us the limits of con-
ventional thinking about CSR as a neoliberal 
technology. What we are seeing here, we sug-
gest, is not some ineluctable impulse of global 
capital driving Norwegian energy companies 
abroad according to a Harveyesque structuralist 
rendering of the logic of transnational capital to 
escape the confi nes of the state and vanquish na-
tional regulation (e.g., Harvey 2005). Rather, we 
argue, internationalization (in keeping with the 
state’s own global ambitions) is itself the driver 
for a project of global diversifi cation, which at 
the same time tends to mobilize a Norwegian 
national identity as a key asset in achieving 
global expansion.
In recent anthropological scholarship, there 
has been much focus on neoliberalism as a trav-
eling and hegemonic model. Th e idea of neolib-
eralism and how it can be studied has, of course, 
been highly contested,1 but still underpins the 
way we think about and study state, capital, 
corporations, and a whole range of other issues 
under the current global situation. At a policy 
level and in public debate, the notion of the free 
market as being at odds with the state has been 
hegemonic. Even analysts have tended to give 
one or the other side in the dichotomy norma-
tive privilege. “Neoliberal” is freely and fl exibly 
used in a normative way by those skeptical of 
any kind of “marketization” or capitalism (Flew 
2012).
A typical contemporary example of state 
versus market thinking is Mariana Mazzucato’s 
infl uential book Th e Entrepreneurial State: De-
bunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths (2018). 
She presents her work as a challenge to “con-
ventional wisdom” concerning the role of gov-
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ernment in the economy and as an attempt to 
re-establish confi dence in the public sector 
(2018: xxiii). Her argument about the important 
role that the state has played in creating some of 
the most important innovations is compelling. 
Referring especially to Karl Polanyi ([1944] 
2001), she acknowledges the critical role of 
“states in shaping and creating markets” (Maz-
zucato 2018: 15), thus seemingly going beyond 
the public-private distinction. Yet, the “conven-
tional wisdom” she refers to is clearly an Anglo-
American neoliberal inspired view on the lim-
ited role the public (or the state) should have in 
the economy, and her strategy for attacking that 
convention is to give more weight to the state 
side of the dichotomy. Although she contends 
that her “book is an open call to change the way 
we talk about the State” (2018: 213), hers is still 
a limited vision of society. State and business 
remain two very distinct spheres, and there is 
nothing between or beyond.
Within this framework, it is diffi  cult to 
engage in nuanced thinking about the Nor-
dic model. Th ere are several good reasons for 
questioning the narrative about the free market 
being at odds with the state. Readings of foun-
dational texts on neoliberalism can be simplis-
tic, reproducing assumptions about the logic of 
neoliberal capital that overlook the nuances and 
countervailing trajectories of specifi c context. 
Second, work on the history of managerialism 
as well as comparative studies of governance 
techniques challenge such conventional read-
ings of neoliberalism by exposing alternative 
trajectories in governance that do not “fi t” the 
“off -the-shelf ” neoliberal model. And fi nally, 
contemporary shift s in the global political econ-
omy destabilize the stock story of state versus 
market.
A variety of approaches to neoliberalism 
inform ethnographic work on contemporary 
economy and society. Nevertheless, the foun-
dational (though very diff erent) texts of David 
Harvey and Michel Foucault continue to dom-
inate the scene, and so it is with these that we 
begin.2 Despite Harvey’s concession that “a di-
alectical relation between territorial [i.e. state] 
and capitalistic logics of power” (Harvey 2003: 
183) exists, capital rules the roost in his ren-
dition of neoliberalism as the uniform driver 
of social and economic change. Focusing on 
the intertwining of capital and governance as 
“economic-institutional ensembles” (Foucault 
2008) makes it possible to refl ect in more sub-
tle and sensible ways about state, capital, and 
markets than Harvey’s and other Marxist-in-
spired approaches to neoliberalism, which tend 
to restrict the working of the state and gover-
nance to a function of “the dynamics of capital 
accumulation and the networks of class power” 
(Harvey 2005: 76; see also Ingham 2011). While 
we acknowledge the crucial power of capitalist 
and class dynamics, we take the view here that 
the development of society, including contem-
porary capitalist societies, involves other forces 
and dynamics. Crucially, these multi-faceted 
dynamics of governance (and the social strug-
gles that determine them) are not reducible to 
the pursuit of profi t and of the so-called logic 
of capital.
When thinking about governance under 
neoliberal conditions, Foucauldian theories of 
governance have been particularly infl uential. 
Neoliberal governance is typically thought to 
account for all forms of governance for market, 
deregulation, privatization, new public man-
agement (NPM), audit culture, and the like. 
Foucault’s exploration of neoliberalism in his 
1978–79 lectures at the Collège de France has 
inspired approaches to neoliberalism that stress 
how the refl exive practice of governance in-
creasingly enacts “competitiveness, commercial 
rationale and risk calculation” (Hilgers 2011: 
358) as the main logics in the art of govern-
ment. “Neoliberal governance” is set to work in 
a grand narrative about a global program for the 
“marketization of everything” and inculcation 
of “neoliberal subjectivities.”
Th is is a simplifi ed articulation of Foucault’s 
nuanced and historically situated understand-
ing of neoliberalism. A closer reading of his 
lectures reveals that he did not think that there 
was only one way that “enterprise society” could 
be organized. He makes the important point 
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that “we are not dealing with an essential Cap-
italism deriving from the logic of Capital, but 
rather with a singular capitalism formed by an 
economic-institutional ensemble” (Foucault 
2008: 167). Echoing Polanyi (2001), Foucault 
thus argues for an understanding of capital-
ism that does not posit a simple continuum 
from free markets with little state interference 
to state-planned economy: the way in which 
capital, markets, states, and other social actors 
are confi gured relative to each other must be 
envisioned and studied along several axes so 
that each unique constellation of factors results 
in distinctive socio-economic-political forma-
tions. Such “economic-institutional ensembles” 
can take many forms, even when organized for 
markets and fostering homo æconomicus (Fou-
cault 2008: 147); the Nordic model may be con-
sidered one such “ensemble.”
Foucault was interested in “the art of govern-
ment” and outlined how North American and 
German neo-liberalisms could be seen as two 
diff erent, contextually dependent, answers to 
the questions of how to “not govern too much” 
while balancing freedom and security. Th e Ger-
man ordoliberalists of the 1940s and 1950s con-
sidered that the best way to ensure that the role 
of the state was constrained so that it could not 
again become the instrument of authoritarian 
policies would be to let it come under the super-
vision of the market. Yet, Foucault argues that 
under ordoliberalism, market/competition and 
state/government were not seen as separate do-
mains. While arguing for “making the market, 
competition, and so the enterprise, into what 
could be called the formative power of society” 
(Foucault 2008: 148), the ordoliberals consid-
ered that competition “is not a principle on 
which it would be possible to erect the whole of 
society” (Foucault 2008: 243). Th ey also wanted 
an active social policy and “a Vitalpolitik, a pol-
itics of life” (Foucault 2008: 148) through which 
was organized a “political and moral frame-
work” distinct from the rules of competition 
(Foucault 2008: 243).
Even though the Varieties of Capitalism ap-
proach (Ingham 2011: 215; Hall and Soskice 
2001) diff erentiates between the ideal types of 
liberal market economies (LME) and coordi-
nated market economies (CME), this does not 
mean that all possible capitalisms can be situ-
ated on a straight axis between these two poles. 
Systems that are not LME are not simply char-
acterized by a strong state; a variety of other 
actors may take important roles—be it trust/
banks, labor unions, guilds, and the like, and 
the level of state involvement may be of very 
diff erent kinds. Norway, France, Russia, and 
China all have strong state involvement in the 
economy, but the organization of their societ-
ies and economies are certainly very diff erent. 
Neither state, corporations, nor capitalism can 
be taken for granted. Corporations have partic-
ular trajectories in diff erent polities. Th e Nordic 
context aff ords one particular polity and has 
fostered corporations with special characteris-
tics. For instance, large private capital does not 
have a long history in Norway and has, to a large 
extent, been tightly associated with the national 
project.
Beyond Foucault: Diversifying 
theories of governance
Th e second reason for questioning the nar-
rative about global hegemonic neoliberalism 
relates to a tendency to read all governance as 
neoliberal. Although we have argued above that 
Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism usefully en-
ables approaches that do not assume an over-
arching global and hegemonic neoliberalism, 
we also acknowledge that a signifi cant limita-
tion of Foucault’s work on neoliberalism is that 
he was primarily interested in the emergence 
of certain ideas about governance. He did not 
pursue in any detail how and to what extent the 
neoliberal rationalities were implemented; in an 
aside (Foucault 2008: 144) he simply states that 
the ordoliberals’ preferred policy “could not be 
strictly applied in Germany” due to the ballast 
of earlier economic policies. Perhaps it is this 
character of his work that has made it so easy to 
read a global program of neoliberal governance 
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into it. Detailed historical and ethnographic 
studies have, however, demonstrated that gov-
ernance techniques we tend to consider neolib-
eral oft en have other origins and are designed 
for other purposes.
Just as New Public Management, audits, 
cost-benefi t calculations, and the like are gen-
erally considered neoliberal governance tech-
niques (Knafo et al. 2019), so we suggest that 
CSR as operationalized by Norwegian state 
energy corporations shows a similar geneal-
ogy to particularly Nordic styles of governance 
and managerialism. “Rather than enforce mar-
ket-like mechanisms[,]” the ambition of pro-
fessional management was to empower policy 
makers and top managers in large organiza-
tions through the “use [of] optimization as a 
tool for governance” (Knafo et al. 2019: 246, 
247). Th e complex management models that 
emerged out of this, especially “stage gate pro-
cess” (Lenfl e and Loch 2009: 12), are today cen-
tral to the work of public authorities and large 
corporations alike—including Equinor and 
Statkraft —and are mirrored in the processes of 
standardization and ethical performance man-
agement and reporting that are the bedrock of 
CSR. Th e authors explain why this managerial 
tradition later has come to be seen as neolib-
eral by the fact that “the rhetoric of neoliberal 
theory was later re-appropriated by those pro-
moting managerial practices of governance and 
who presented their framework as a means to 
produce ‘market-like logics’” (Knafo et al. 2019: 
247–248).
Equally, we draw on insights from com-
parative ethnography on China (Kipnis 2008; 
Nonini 2008) and post-Soviet studies (Collier 
2011; Lampland 1995), which have also made 
crucial strides in disrupting the grand narra-
tive of neoliberalism. Donald Nonini criticizes 
anthropological assertions that China is be-
coming neoliberal, challenges claims that uni-
versalize neoliberalization, and “argues for a 
diff erent and more complex anthropological 
understanding of how state formation, politics, 
cultural practices and economic transforma-
tions are related to one another” (2008: 147). 
Andrew Kipnis, taking issue especially with 
Niklas Rose’s approach (e.g. 1999), convinc-
ingly conveys how the comprehensive audits 
system in Chinese schools has its own unique 
trajectory and (non-market) rationale and is 
not a result of diff usion of neoliberal rationality. 
Kipnis holds that in place of pursuing the al-
leged diff usion of a “regime of truth,” we should, 
rather, explore the scientism that informs and 
legitimizes many diff erent audit systems, the 
performance of which should be seen as “tech-
niques for manipulating local social relations” 
(Kipnis 2008: 282). Th us, in place of explaining 
all new forms of governance that involve audit-
ing, statistics, metrics, competition, and the like 
as neoliberal, we may be well advised to focus 
rather on management, bureaucratization, gov-
ernance, standardization, rationalization, and 
scientism—that is, ways of “seeing like a gov-
erning agent” (Kipnis 2008: 282), to paraphrase 
James Scott (1998). What are considered neolib-
eral governance techniques are oft en complex 
mergers of models with separate trajectories 
and purposes.
Th e fi nal reason for questioning the neolib-
eral account is the current shift  in the global 
economic system. With the rise of China, new 
protectionist policies in the United States, and 
a turn to more authoritative governments, a re-
alization emerges that there must be other ways 
of confi guring capital, markets, and the state 
than those articulated in the standard narrative 
about neoliberalization modeled on pervasive 
Anglo-American ideas about the state and (pri-
vate) capital. Keith Hart has recently suggested 
that the “neoliberal hegemony may be cracking.” 
He argues that, “a swing back to state interven-
tion is now more likely than any time in the last 
four decades,” but asks, “what is the state now 
and where can it be found?” (Hart 2018: 546).
Th at question is perhaps best answered by 
problematizing the classic state-society dual-
ity and “[treating] state and non-state govern-
mentality within a common frame” (Ferguson 
and Gupta 2002: 994). Indeed Ferguson and 
Gupta argue that it is precisely through non-
state actors (including both local NGOs and 
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international organizations) that state power is 
reconfi gured, as states attempt to extend their 
authority across new scales creating networks of 
transnational governance and “stake their claim 
to superior generality and universality” (2002: 
996). Th us, the question must rather be: where 
can governance be found? And, how do these 
models of governance travel? While Ferguson 
and Gupta do not consider TNCs at all in their 
exploration of transnational governance, we 
argue that TNCs are key sites (and purveyors) 
of governance on a national and global scale, a 
role authorized and validated by the discourse 
of CSR/corporate citizenship, and are thus key 
to understanding the relation between capital 
and governance. Th e case study on Statkraft  in 
this issue, for instance, explores governance as 
it is enacted in the complex interface between 
the Norwegian state, the corporation, interna-
tional institutions and standards, and the Turk-
ish state.
Most studies of contemporary governance 
start from the premise that that neoliberal mod-
els travel from Global North to South (or global 
economic center to periphery), establishing 
themselves in new places in a form of (neo-
liberal) bureaucratic imperialism. Jamie Peck 
and Nik Th eodore (2015) challenge this as-
sumption, arguing that progressive governance 
policies, now oft en developed in the Global 
South, may become traveling models and spread 
rapidly to other jurisdictions. Sometimes these 
compete, sometimes they merge, with policies 
that will usually be considered neoliberal.
Following their lead, in this collection we 
hope to provide a counterbalance to the preoc-
cupation with the workings of governance and 
capital in so-called archetypal neoliberal states 
or in the ways weak states are captured/sidelined 
by TNCs. Rather, we focus on corporations 
working out of Norway, a developed economy 
with a strong state ostensibly less impacted by 
the neo-liberal logic than most other Western 
states. Below we discuss the “actually existing” 
Nordic model as an assemblage of diff erent gov-
ernance techniques and actors, admittedly in-
creasingly informed by neoliberal doctrines, but 
with their own unique histories and characters. 
We make the claim that it makes sense to think 
about Nordic societies as unique and not repre-
senting only versions of the neoliberal model. 
And, the Nordic model, while adopting models 
from the outside, may also harbor governance 
techniques that can travel elsewhere. Th us, we 
ask, do the Norwegian energy corporations we 
have studied take with them techniques of gov-
ernance that can be identifi ed as particular to 
the Norwegian context (such as strong union 
representation, the consensus model, or egali-
tarian ethos) when working abroad? For exam-
ple, a key question that motivates Siri Lange’s 
study of the Norwegian oil giant, Equinor, in 
this collection, is how (and to what extent) 
the company attempts to introduce the Nordic 
“consensus model” of union representation and 
employment relations in their greenfi eld opera-
tions in Tanzania.
Th e Nordic model
Above we have argued for the importance of 
problematizing the public-private distinction 
and historicizing the relationship between state, 
capital, and CSR. Accordingly, in the follow-
ing sections, we fi rst make the argument that it 
makes sense to talk about a Nordic model and 
explain why by outlining the emergence and 
characteristics of the model. Subsequent sections 
review reforms of the Norwegian state since the 
1980s and the evolving policy for state-owned 
corporations, which we show to be driven by 
accelerating internationalization of Norwegian 
capital and interests.
Th e Nordic model is a result of the particular 
trajectories of political and economic develop-
ments in the Nordic countries during the last 
one hundred to two hundred years. We focus 
here on Norway where a progressive constitu-
tion from 1814, the relative lack of both nobility 
and powerful bourgeoisie, a decentralized petty 
bourgeoisie, and independent municipalities 
and co-ops have facilitated the emergence of 
a relatively egalitarian society. Yet, industrial-
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ization from the 1880s onward resulted in the 
same kinds of tensions and unrest as in other 
European countries between emerging capi-
talists and laborers. Many years of strife ended 
when the major labor union and the employers’ 
organization agreed to the “Major Agreement” 
(Hovedavtalen) in 1935, which set the rules for 
how to manage relations between parties. With 
the state also involved, the basis was set for a 
tripartite cooperation that would be deepened 
aft er the war and fi nd its most comprehensive 
solutions in the “income-political settlements” 
(inntektspolitiske oppgjør) during the 1970s 
when the deals included not only salaries but 
also comprehensive adjustments of the welfare 
system, pensions, employee representation on 
company boards, and so forth. Th is basic struc-
ture of the tripartite cooperation remains in 
place.
Similar developments took place in the other 
Nordic countries, which can be said to share 
the following characteristics: “(1) exceptionally 
egalitarian and democratic political traditions, 
(2) the welfare state and (3) labour market pol-
itics and regulations” (Ervasti et al. 2008: 3). 
Although the kind of state involved in the tri-
partite cooperation has sometimes been char-
acterized as the “corporatist state,” the Nordic 
corporatist state does not substitute for, but 
adds to democratic mechanisms. Th e “state” is 
not a strong central state (e.g., the French state), 
but rather is “remarkably decentralized, and the 
commitments of the welfare state seem to be ex-
ceptionally well embedded in institutions under 
local, popular control” (Vike 2012: 128).
Th e political left  in Norway has increasingly 
appropriated the model—now talking about the 
“Norwegian societal model”—and, in addition 
to the structural and economic variables men-
tioned above, considers core values such as trust, 
cooperation, consensus, openness, community 
( fellesskap), and egalitarianism to be constitu-
tive and to guarantee the success of the model. 
Th ere is widely shared trust in the state; the lead-
ing union (LO-Norway; Landsorganisasjonen i 
Norge) emphasizes the value of the “commu-
nal-state” ( fellesskapsstaten). While the Nordic/
Norwegian model is thus associated with cer-
tain values and norms—a certain “culture”—we 
think it unwise to try to discern whether these 
are a result or cause of the social-regulatory 
dimensions of the model. It makes no sense to 
try to identify “essential” Nordic values, but if 
there is a single element that, were it removed 
from the model, would render it “non-Nordic,” 
we would say it is the infl uence that the labor 
movement has on capital and the state. Beyond 
that, the Nordic model is contested and unsta-
ble. It is a moving target, but, also, potentially 
transferable. Th e Economist (2013) suggests that 
other countries may learn from “the new Nor-
dic model,” which “begins with the individual 
rather than the state,” with openness and the 
willingness to reform.
“Towards a better organized state”
Since the 1980s and at times in the vanguard, 
the Nordic countries have enacted signifi cant 
reforms—experimenting with and developing 
new ways of creating and governing markets3—
that are oft en considered of a neoliberal charac-
ter (for Sweden, see Harvey 2005). In Norway, 
reforms of the state were discussed and imple-
mented to some extent before neoliberal ideas 
about the role of the state started to circulate 
and then accelerated aft er internationalization 
gained momentum. Th e initial driver was in dy-
namics largely internal to the Norwegian state, 
with concerns already in the 1960s related to 
“modernization” and “effi  ciency” in the state, 
and to the mixing of diff erent roles within the 
same agencies (Herning 2009: 68). Policies such 
as internal independence/devolution ( fristill-
ing) within state governance, management by 
objectives (målstyring), and corporatization 
(see Herning 2009: 11–12) were seen as natural 
and realistic tools to modernize the state.
Beyond the internal dynamics, the seem-
ingly ubiquitous presence of the state across all 
dimensions of life resulted in the growth of a 
popular countermovement, which brought the 
Conservative Party to power in the early 1980s, 
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ousting the Labor Party, which had dominated 
politics since World War II. Signifi cant reforms 
were implemented and were not overturned 
when the Labor Party came back into power.
Th e momentum for reform was channeled 
into the green paper “A Better Organized State” 
(Prop. 5 1989), arguably the single most import-
ant green paper ever in Norway. It contended 
that societal, demographic, and technological 
changes in Norway necessitated considerable 
reforms of the state in order to maintain its 
effi  ciency and legitimacy. Overall, the report 
emphasizes the importance and implications of 
internationalization (see, e.g., Prop. 5 1989: 40–
41, 42), for example, arguing for the organiza-
tion of state-owned corporations as stock-based 
fi rms since that is a form that is “well known 
and acknowledged nationally as well as interna-
tionally” (Prop. 5 1989: 155).
Th e combined impact of pressure from 
within the state and a political and ideological 
shift  toward policies reminiscent of the “Th ird 
Way,” eventually resulted in signifi cant corpora-
tization and privatization of state agencies and 
assets. Yet, the total thrust of the reforms never 
was as dramatic and deep as in the “iconic” 
neoliberal experiments. Th e actors who initi-
ated and fought for reform and restructuring 
of stage agencies were not necessarily ideo-
logically motivated by a neoliberal program, 
and “agencifi cation and corporatization have 
a much longer history [in Norway] than the 
NPM reform movement” (Lægreid et al. 2013: 
670). Managers of state agencies and state enter-
prises also lobbied actively for corporatization 
(e.g., Statkraft , see Nilsen and Th ue 2006) and 
privatization (e.g., Equinor, see Sæther 2017), 
fi rst to facilitate a management less restrained 
by state bureaucratic structures, then to be able 
to internationalize.
Th us, the corporatization of Statkraft  (1992) 
and partial privatization of Equinor (2001) were 
not results of a neoliberal policy for “marketiza-
tion,” but, rather, answers to historically specifi c 
challenges. “Internationalization” was one such 
particular historic specifi c challenge experienced 
by the management in these corporations from 
the late 1980s onward. And, despite these re-
forms, it still makes sense to talk about a partic-
ular Nordic/Norwegian “economic-institutional 
ensemble,” where the basic architectures of the 
tripartite model and of the welfare state are in 
place, to the extent that in the North Sea oil 
economies “Norwegian trade unions remain 
important actors (beyond the wildest dreams of 
their UK counterparts)” (Cumbers 2012: 238).
State ownership: 
Professional and (in)active
Although state ownership of oil and gas corpo-
rations is now more the rule than the exception 
globally, the anthropological literature has not 
explored the way states manage their owner-
ship nor what consequences that may have for 
corporate responsibility. In the next section, 
we consider the Norwegian state’s “expecta-
tions” concerning the corporate responsibility 
of state-owned corporations. Before we do so, 
this section of the article provides a brief out-
line to the nuts and bolts of state ownership and 
the Norwegian government’s claim that they 
pursue transparent, pragmatic, “professional,” 
and “active” ownership policy in the context of 
internationalization.
First, it is important to note that even com-
pared with the other Nordic countries,4 state 
capitalism has been particularly important in 
Norway. Th e Norwegian state and municipal-
ities have been heavily involved in transport, 
postal services, energy and telecommunica-
tions, and industry, especially aft er World War I 
(Lie 2016). When oil extraction started during 
the early 1970s, the state controlled most di-
mensions of the sector. Th e successful incorpo-
ration of the oil industry into the Nordic model 
probably contributed to the relative success of 
the oil economy, avoiding Dutch disease and the 
resource curse. State ownership—or, more pre-
cisely, public ownership—is now much higher 
in Norway than in any other Western European 
and OECD country. Public institutions in Nor-
way own approximately a third of all equity in 
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Norway,5 and the Norwegian state owns 35 per-
cent of the shares on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
Five out of the six most valuable corporations 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange are controlled by 
the Norwegian state (Lie et al. 2014: 86).
State ownership in Norway has largely de-
veloped pragmatically during the last few de-
cades (Lie 2016; Lie et al. 2014). Th e current 
state ownership policy is a political compro-
mise: large and relatively “active” state owner-
ship (favored by the left ) versus managed with 
discipline, commercial “professionalism,” and 
little involvement from the state (favored by 
the right) (Lie 2016: 924). “Professionalism” 
denotes “business-like management” as well as 
non-involvement by the state. Th is is partly re-
lated to the legacy of the so-called Kings Bay 
case,6 which toppled the government in 1963 
(Lie et al. 2014) and instituted an unwritten 
rule in Norwegian state governance that rep-
resentatives from the government (politicians 
as well as civil servants) must not have central 
roles in state-owned businesses. Th us, the fact 
of state ownership is widely accepted, while how 
the state exerts its ownership has been a bone 
of contention. Th ere has been disagreement 
particularly over how much the state should 
interfere (be “active”) in the operation of its 
corporations.
Since the early 2000s, the state’s ownership 
of corporations has become “objectifi ed,” with 
a consolidated focus and apparatus for mak-
ing ownership visible and governable through 
a suite of instruments and rules: a Department 
of Ownership was established within the Min-
istry of Trade and Industry; guidelines for the 
overall ownership policy have been outlined in 
dedicated white papers; occasional reports set 
out governmental “ownership policies”; an an-
nual ownership report summarizes results for 
all companies (75 in 2017) in which the state has 
full or partial ownership.7
Th e main aims for the government’s own-
ership, as articulated in the white papers, are 
to execute its role in a “professional” manner, 
pursue commercial goals, and contribute to 
long-term economic growth and industrial de-
velopment. For the largest “commercial” state-
owned corporations, this has primarily meant 
producing revenue for the shareholder-state. 
Yet, from the fi rst white paper addressing state 
ownership, there has been a consistent focus on 
the importance of globalization and interna-
tionalization, actualizing debate about ethics in 
new ways (Meld. St. 61 1996–1997). Experience 
has shown that active ownership quickly comes 
up against a perceived need to abide by the rules 
of international capitalism. Some of the inter-
national activities of Equinor, such as tar sands 
extraction in Canada, have been controversial 
abroad and at home. Yet, the government has 
declined to instruct or in any other way put 
pressure on Equinor (Lie et al. 2014: 87; Sæther 
2017: 304). Demonstrating to the world (that is, 
the global fi nance markets) that the Norwegian 
state pursued “professional” non-interfering 
ownership was considered crucial. Th us, the 
new, consolidated and professional way to gov-
ern ethics of the state-owned corporations is for 
the state to articulate through white papers and 
ownership reports clear “expectations” or rules 
for responsible corporate conduct.
CSR as a state matter 
for global engagement
“Corrupt countries line up for Statoil” claimed 
an article in the major Norwegian daily Aft en-
posten in 2006 (Lynum and Haraldsen 2006). 
Equinor (previously Statoil), Telenor, Statkraft , 
Norsk Hydro—all among the largest Norwegian 
corporations and all with state ownership—have 
each been involved in scandals in their overseas 
operations. Th is has been a serious issue for 
the reputation of the corporations and of the 
Norwegian state, and members of parliament 
have been concerned that Norway’s reputation 
abroad may be harmed (Ihlen 2011: 14–16). 
Th e scandals have been addressed in several 
white papers on state ownership. Norsk Hydro’s 
failed attempt to establish a bauxite producing 
facility in Orissa, India, during the 1990s due 
to local resistance and global media exposure 
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was discussed in the governmental White Pa-
per on CSR (Meld. St. 10 2008–2009: 43) as an 
example of why Norwegian corporations need 
more comprehensive CSR strategies to address 
“complex challenges” and higher expectations 
in the “international civil society community.” 
A 2004 green paper considers that “the state’s 
legitimacy may be reduced, for example as law-
maker or in cases that relate to foreign policy, if 
the state through its role as owner does not pur-
sue high standards in this fi eld” (Prop. 53 2003–
2004: 16). As the Norwegian state increasingly 
operates as an international capitalist, can it 
maintain the high ethical standards embedded 
in the Nordic model and align that with the in-
ternational image of Norway as a humanitarian 
superpower?
We argue that it is this context—the prob-
lems that Norwegian, oft en state-owned, cor-
porations have faced in acting responsibly 
abroad—that has molded thinking about CSR 
in Norway. Th e formalization of CSR was a 
government initiative with the establishment of 
KOMPAKT in 1998, which was “a consultative 
body consisting of the traditional corporatist 
partners as well as NGOs and academia, with 
the explicit goal of providing a forum for dis-
cussion” (Gjølberg 2010: 212). Importantly, this 
consultative body was from the start embedded 
within the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs and is 
tasked “[t]o strengthen the Government’s basis 
for developing policy and for decision-making 
in the area of CSR, with particular emphasis on 
international issues” (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs 2019).
Two interrelated claims have been made 
about CSR in the Nordic countries, the fi rst rep-
resented by the idea, expressed by, for example, 
managers at Statkraft , that “we are CSR, we do 
not need CSR in Norway,” since much of what 
CSR policies try to achieve is “already in place” 
in the Nordic countries. Th e second claim is 
that the Nordic model makes Norwegian cor-
porations well prepared for competition in an 
international arena (Ihlen 2011: 48). Th is seems 
to be confi rmed by the high score and many 
prizes Nordic corporations receive for their CSR 
work (Strand et al. 2015). However, it has also 
been argued that the “Nordic state-market-so-
ciety model” is at odds with the US “business 
case” model of CSR, which implicitly grants dis-
cretionary powers to businesses, acknowledges 
unions only as “stakeholders,” and “can appear 
illegitimate in the context of the ‘Nordic nor-
mative legacy’” (Gjølberg 2010: 210). Unions in 
Norway—as in the rest of the Nordic countries 
and in much of Europe—tend to take a critical 
stance toward CSR. Th ey are particularly con-
cerned about the way CSR sidesteps or ignores 
the institutionalization of workers’ rights in 
laws and regulations, making voluntary import-
ant societal concerns that should be required 
and regulated (Trygstad and Lismoen 2008). So, 
was the Nordic model the foundation when the 
government came to develop CSR policies for 
state-owned corporations?
Successive governments since 2001 have ex-
pected that corporations with state ownership 
take a leading role in work on CSR (Meld. St. 13 
2006–2007: 64). Th e white paper on “CSR in a 
Global Economy” elaborated some of the ratio-
nale: “To an increasing extent, Norwegian com-
panies are engaging in commercial activities 
in, and trade with, countries that are aff ected 
by political instability, widespread poverty or 
corruption” (Meld. St. 10 2008–2009: 7). For the 
last ten years, there has been increased focus on 
CSR in the dialogue between the state and its 
companies and in ownership reports. Th e move 
toward the business case for CSR is well illus-
trated by Monica Mæland, Conservative Min-
ister for Trade and Industry, who stated that “to 
be good corporations and give high returns in 
the long run, they need to handle their social 
responsibility (samfunnsansvar) in a good way” 
(Aft enposten, 16 April 2016).
What we see in the development of CSR in 
Norway is that it aligns with international trends: 
with time evolving from “philanthropy” through 
“risk management” to “value creation”—illus-
trated by a fi gure lift ed from the UN’s Global 
Compact (Meld. St. 10 2008–2009). Further-
more, the coupling of CSR with “sustainabil-
ity,” as well as the expectation that Sustainable 
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Development Goals (SDG) will be addressed in 
reporting, shows that the language and models 
for CSR closely follow international trends.
Th us, the Norwegian state does not expect 
corporations to adhere to some specifi c Nor-
dic or Norwegian model for CSR, but, rather, 
requires corporations in which the state has 
signifi cant ownership and which have overseas 
operations to be serious about CSR by signing 
on to the Global Compact, following the OECD 
responsible business conduct recommendations 
for multinational corporations, taking up the 
International Labor Organization’s core conven-
tions and applying Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) Standards (Meld. St. 27 2013–2014: 81). 
A “Nordic concern” about CSR is addressed by 
expecting corporations to adhere to “universal” 
standards and mechanisms.
A number of various international con-
ventions and institutions are in place to guide 
businesses and other organizations to behave as 
responsibly as possible. It is outside the scope 
of this article to review these frameworks, ex-
cept to mention of a few general characteristics 
and trends. First, adherence to most of the stan-
dards and principles is voluntary. Even though 
sustainability reporting is increasingly becom-
ing compulsory, it is not supported by any sanc-
tions other than “naming and blaming.” Second, 
there is a distinction between standards that 
one may sign on to and submit annual CSR re-
ports to, such as the UN Global Compact and 
the GRI framework, and standards that provide 
tools for actual guidance in the fi eld—the most 
widely used being the WB International Finan-
cial Corporation’s Performance Standards (see 
Knudsen, Müft üoğlu, et al. this issue). Th ird, 
a new industry has burgeoned to serve and 
feed the appetite for “sustainability reporting” 
over the last fi ve to ten years, leading to profi -
ciency in sustainability reporting as a particular 
skill and making for a larger role for audit fi rms 
in consulting and advising on sustainability 
issues.
At the same time, international standards 
clearly play diff erent roles in diff erent indus-
tries and diff erent contexts. While oil (and gas) 
extraction has been an international business 
for 150 years, with the resources, capital, and 
know-how being highly mobile, oil TNCs seem 
paradoxically to be less restricted by interna-
tional standards and frameworks than hydro-
power corporations that, until a few decades 
ago, were primarily confi ned to national mar-
kets. Hydropower, oil, and gas provide diff erent 
material-technical properties, with dissimilar 
scaling properties, resulting in divergent en-
ergy producing activities that involve a variety 
of constellations of capital-state-international 
relations.
Oil and gas, together with other extractive 
industries, have typically been controlled by 
shareholder and state funding, and the primary 
response to local resistance and environmental 
activism has typically unfolded as classical CSR 
and a concern with local content. Hydropower, 
on the other hand, grew from disconnected 
local projects, gradually becoming networked 
into national systems oft en controlled by the 
state. Development of hydropower was embed-
ded within national developmental policies. 
With electrifi cation considered crucial for de-
velopment, large dam projects came to be iconic 
elements in the development drive of emerging 
economies from the 1960s onward. Since such 
development initiatives were oft en supported by 
the World Bank or regional development banks 
(such as the Asian Development Bank) rather 
than private capital, resistance and controver-
sies became more readily internationalized. 
Th is, in turn, stimulated the evolution and use 
of international standards, such as the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation’s Performance Stan-
dards in the hydropower sector (see Knudsen, 
Müft üoğlu, et al., this issue).
With intensifying global concern for climate 
change, the reputational challenge has shift ed 
signifi cantly in favor of hydropower and its im-
portant role in the green transition. When Nor-
wegian hydropower engaged in its fi rst projects 
beyond Europe in the 1990s, they were typically 
“large dam” projects that came with challenges 
such as large scale human resettlement. Th ese 
projects also typically took place within a de-
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velopmental aid framework, stimulated partly 
by Norway’s drive to become a humanitarian 
superpower.
A humanitarian superpower 
pursuing global business
When large Norwegian corporations operate 
abroad, they do so in a context in which Nor-
way plays an important role in the domains of 
peace, aid, humanitarian eff orts, and climate 
change diplomacy. Do Norwegian business and 
Norwegian humanitarian diplomacy impact 
each other? Is the way in which Statkraft  and 
Equinor handle CSR infl uenced by Norway’s 
other engagements globally? We argue that while 
this context is intangible, it does have some real 
implications. Business and aid/peace/foreign di-
plomacy are sometimes connected, but not ev-
erywhere: the connection is crucial for Equinor’s 
involvement in Tanzania, while the Norwegian 
embassy in Ankara only learned through news 
media that Equinor had decided to invest in Tur-
key in 2016. With Norwegian business expand-
ing abroad during the last couple of decades, 
potential for convergence, cooperation, or ten-
sion has increased.
Norwegian foreign direct investment had a 
slow start in the 1960s and did not become sig-
nifi cant until 1985 (Hveem 2009: 384).8 During 
the 1990s, the total accumulated Norwegian 
direct investment abroad increased by 500 per-
cent (Stråtveit 2015: 24) with Norway becoming 
a net exporter of capital investments in 1995 
(Hveem 2009: 384). From 2000 to 2012, Nor-
wegian foreign direct investment tripled, to 
reach 135 billion euros in 2012 (Stråtveit 2015: 
26) and 175 billion euros in 2017 (SSB 2019). 
Th ese numbers exclude the so-called Oil Fund 
(Government Pension Fund Global), which is a 
pure investment fund of now around a trillion 
euros. Th e larger share of Norwegian direct 
investments abroad is undertaken by corpora-
tions that have signifi cant state ownership, such 
as Statoil, Statkraft , Norsk Hydro, Telenor, and 
Yara (Lie et al. 2014: 111).
Norway may be unique in Europe when it 
comes to the role of state capital in foreign in-
vestments. If we turn to Asia however, we fi nd 
some interesting similarities between the ways 
Norwegian and Chinese state capital is set to 
work abroad. Both took off  during the 1990s, 
both seek profi t, and both Norwegian (as 
shown by our research) and Chinese (Lee 2017) 
state-owned corporations are sensitive to local 
circumstances. However, given the very dif-
ferent positions in the global economy as well 
as diverging state trajectories and geopolitical 
alignments, dissimilarities surpass similarities. 
(Surplus) Chinese state capital is generally set to 
work as state loans, which come with the condi-
tion that Chinese entrepreneurs are contracted 
for the project that the loan funds. (Surplus) 
Norwegian state capital, on the other hand, is 
fi rst and foremost set to work in the “Oil Fund,” 
which is not used strategically for political 
gains, and secondly through state ownership 
in corporations active abroad. While Norwe-
gian state capital primarily seeks revenues and 
is sometimes conjoined with the Norwegian 
state’s humanitarian ambitions, Chinese state 
capital is deployed to pursue political interests 
and access to resources (e.g., minerals). Th us, 
Norwegian state-owned TNCs are in many re-
spects more similar to privately owned (share-
holding) TNCs than to Chinese state-owned 
TNCs. As Ching Kwan Lee cogently notes, 
“[o]wnership categories . . . are poor guides to 
corporate objectives” (2017: 4).
Corporate management within state agen-
cies was the main driver for the international-
ization of Norwegian state capital (Nilsen and 
Th ue 2006; Sæther 2017). Limited investment 
opportunities in Norway prompted corpora-
tions to look abroad. Th e authorities did not 
look unfavorably on this development (Lie et al. 
2014: 111). Since 1990, state capital surplus was 
primarily invested abroad (to prevent “Dutch 
disease”) through the “Oil Fund.” In 1996, La-
bour Prime Minister Th orbjørn Jagland de-
termined that internationalization would also 
make it more diffi  cult for the state to secure tax 
income. He considered that this could be off set 
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by securing the state—as shareholder—income 
through investment in Norwegian corporate 
investments abroad (Sejersted 1999: 98n179). 
Th is was reiterated in the 2000/2001 New Year 
speech of Labour premier Stoltenberg implicitly 
urging Statkraft  to explore projects abroad: “the 
time for construction of new large hydropower 
plants in Norway is over” (Government of Nor-
way 2001).
In the case of both Statkraft  and Statoil, the 
perceived need to move abroad was a decisive 
factor in stimulating corporatization (or “corpo-
rate normalization”), which started in Statoil in 
1988 (Th urber and Istad 2012). Statoil learned 
international operations by partnering closely 
with British Petroleum during the 1990s. In 
2001, under a Labour government, Statoil was 
partly privatized and became a listed company. 
In 2008, it merged with the oil and gas section of 
Norsk Hydro to better compete internationally. 
Statkraft  and Statoil gradually built stronger 
corporate identities, their own ways of doing 
things, and unique logos. Th e most recent shift  
in corporate identity came in May 2018 when 
Statoil took the new name Equinor. Th e name 
change also makes state ownership less obvious. 
In the case of Statkraft , international expansion 
was not only motivated by limitations on fur-
ther investments in Norway, but also by struc-
tural changes in the European power supply 
system (Knudsen, Müft üoğlu, et al., this issue).
How is Norwegian (state) capitalism abroad 
related to Norway’s other international engage-
ments? In 2016, the volume of Norwegian aid 
was 37 billion NOK (Norad 2019), only 2 per-
cent of (accumulated) Norwegian direct invest-
ment abroad. Still, Norway donated 1.11 percent 
of its Gross National Income (GNI) to Offi  cial 
Development Assistance (OECD 2017: 141)—a 
higher percentage of GNI than any other coun-
try. Norway has played a central role in a num-
ber of peace negotiations (see, e.g., Stokke 2012) 
and its charge of the Nobel Peace Prize certainly 
contributes to Norway’s association with peace 
internationally and locally. Overall, by “doing 
good,” the “humanitarian superpower” Norway 
is trying to take an international role that far 
exceeds the relative size of its population, par-
ticularly now with the government’s campaign 
for a place on the UN Security Council. Norwe-
gian governments have consistently supported 
global governance, especially through the UN. 
In its eff orts for aid, peace, and humanitarian 
assistance, the state has oft en been involved 
with Norwegian NGOs and academicians.
While these eff orts may seem altruistic, 
some of Norway’s donation to the international 
community can be seen as an instrument for 
legitimizing continued oil production back 
home (Norway has had a policy of making the 
CO2 cuts abroad). Norway is the world’s biggest 
supporter of REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation) (Svarstad and 
Benjaminsen 2018). Brazil has been the larg-
est recipient of Norwegian aid for many years 
through the Norwegian contribution to rainfor-
est preservation. Sometimes, when the stakes 
are high, economic interests are clearly prior-
itized over the image of a peace-loving nation 
that cares about the world. Aft er the Nobel Prize 
Committee in 2010 awarded the Peace Prize 
to the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, China’s 
sanctions so drastically reduced exports from 
Norway to China (Kolstad, 2020) that the Nor-
wegian government refused to meet with the 
Dalai Lama when he visited Norway in 2014.
Underlying much of Norway’s international 
engagement is the assumption, we argue, that 
“Norwegian values” should be the template for, 
or are consistent with, the ideal form of uni-
versal human rights Th is is one version of the 
pervasive idea in Norway that “we do it better” 
(e.g., our extraction of oil and gas is cleaner) 
(see Sæther 2017). Th us, in the promotion of 
the Norwegian “way” internationally, the socio-
logical understanding of the Nordic model—
with tripartite negotiations, welfare state, and so 
forth—is glossed over and the model is reborn 
as resting on certain values (trust, consensus, 
gender balance, and egalitarianism) that should 
ideally be universal. Th e ownership policy’s 
support for global standards and reporting 
framework is consistent with this, as is the de-
velopment policy. Successive Norwegian gov-
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ernments have striven to have the Nordic model 
“replicated” at a global level, but given the min-
imal infl uence that, for example, the UN Global 
Compact really has on corporations (Orock 
2013; Scholz and Vitols 2019: 239; Welker 2009: 
145, 2014: 15), this amounts to little relative to 
the power wielded by TNCs.
In the fi rst phase of Norwegian development 
cooperation, Norway’s aid policies were not 
much intertwined with the interests that Nor-
way’s foreign policy pursued and were based 
on long term bilateral commitments to a few 
selected countries. From the early 1990s, this 
began to change. Norwegian aid gradually be-
came a central part of Norwegian foreign pol-
icy, and funds were increasingly directed toward 
countries in confl ict and to global funds (Sørbø 
2020). Th e Norwegian vision of “development” 
has been inspired by Amartya Sen and the idea 
that individual economic and political freedom, 
along with respect for human rights, is the “core 
criteria” for development (Dale 2018). “Th is 
vision of development, which Norway has sub-
scribed to for a long time, has in common with 
the ‘Nordic model’ that cooperation will result 
in a better society. [But,] [t]he kind of confl icts 
of interests that were part of Norway’s path to a 
welfare society are not part of this model” (Dale 
2018: 5). Th e Norwegian state’s approach to in-
ternational relations has developed so “that the 
meaning of interest has broadened to include 
the concept of value and idealism” (Stokke 
2012: 227). Norway has engaged in a specifi c 
kind of “value diplomacy” (Stokke 2012). It is 
the assumed Norwegian qua universal values 
that Norway seeks to export, not the Nordic tri-
partite organizational model. A cynical reading 
would be that Norwegian humanitarian diplo-
macy has not so much to do with the Nordic 
model but more with Norway’s desired stand-
ing, impact, and reputation internationally.
We have argued that globalization and the 
perceived need to internationalize Norwegian 
state capital—not adoption of neoliberal ideol-
ogy and policies—have been the main drivers 
for the way Norwegian corporations handle 
CSR abroad. Yet, this approach has been shaped 
by Norway’s position/role in the global econ-
omy, which is characterized by surplus capital 
based on a prudently managed and technolog-
ically advanced natural resource-based econ-
omy, and having an interest in maintaining an 
open economy.
Th ere is not much “Nordic” left  when Nor-
wegian state capital is set to work abroad 
beyond the state’s expectation that these corpo-
rations will adhere to the highest international 
standards. Being Nordic or Norwegian may, in 
certain instances, be a resource for the corpo-
rations, but it is deployed strategically and only 
as convenient. Th ere is considerable variation 
across the case studies, with Statkraft ’s work in 
Turkey informed by international standards, 
and the Nordic tripartite model tenuously rep-
licated in Tanzania—albeit without the perhaps 
most important actor: the Tanzanian state. In 
Brazil, the Brazilian state dictates how Equinor 
should administer CSR.
Th e corporations are heterogeneous, where 
the people who are positioned diff erently geo-
graphically as well as organizationally have 
diff erent perspectives and interests. To a large 
extent, the fi nance offi  cers in Equinor’s Lon-
don offi  ce fi nd the Norwegian identity to be a 
burden, while those working in Norway and 
within the Norwegian sector tend to embrace 
the link between corporate and national iden-
tity. Th e state’s expectation that the state-owned 
corporations will be “ambassadors” for Norway 
abroad is only very vaguely expressed, and, in 
practice, the state has accepted that Norwegian 
state capitalism abroad plays to the tune of in-
ternational capitalism, not to the Nordic model. 
Adapting to globalization, representatives of the 
state have transferred power to corporate man-
agement and boards, which, in most cases, are 
left  to manage their corporations as any other 
TNC, latching on to the latest fad of corporate 
responsibility, be it “sustainability,” “environ-
mental and social governance,” or SDGs.
However, the strategy of the corporations 
and the extent to which the corporations and 
the foreign policy of the state is aligned varies 
according to place. While the pursuit for profi t 
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is overall the major objective, this is sometimes 
moderated by the concern for Norway’s repu-
tation as a humanitarian superpower. Th is also 
induces the Norwegian state to support mul-
tilateralism in the form of international stan-
dards and agreements. Yet, as the case studies 
in this thematic section show, neither the Nor-
dic model, the Norwegian state’s “expectations” 
toward the corporations, nor the international 
framework explain the way the Norwegian cor-
porations handle corporate ethics abroad. Th e 
“universalism” of Norway’s humanitarian in-
ternationalism is, however, selective in that the 
tradition of selecting some developing countries 
as main “partners” for Norwegian development 
collaboration means that the interaction and 
fl ow of people between Norway and some coun-
tries in the Global South (especially Tanzania) 
has been particularly signifi cant since the 1970s.
It goes without saying that bilateral relations 
cultivated and maintained by the Norwegian 
state with other states vary considerably, as the 
contributions in this collection demonstrate. 
Th e terms of engagement between the Nor-
wegian state and Tanzania, for example, diff er 
greatly from those with Brazil. Relations be-
tween these host states and Norway’s largest oil 
producer diff er accordingly. As Lange shows, 
the long history of donor-recipient relations be-
tween Norway and Tanzania are a key factor in 
the relationship between Equinor and the Tan-
zanian government as it plays out today. Juxta-
posed to this, in Strønen’s contribution we fi nd 
the same company pursuing divergent practices 
of CSR to very diff erent eff ects in Brazil where 
the legacies of neo-colonial aid relations are 
absent. At the same time these evolving rela-
tionships are shaped as much by diff erences in 
policies pursued by host states toward Nordic 
corporations and their varying approaches to 
the question of corporate ethics. Th e variegated 
local unfolding of particular projects shows that 
even under neoliberal international capitalism—
the tune to which the Norwegian state and cor-
porations play—local actors maintain signifi cant 
agency in shaping and domesticating the way 
corporations enact CSR.
Overview of the section
Th e contributions in this special section ex-
plore the questions raised in this introduction 
through empirical case studies that reveal con-
tinuity and variety in the practices of CSR by 
Norwegian energy companies in a range of geo-
graphic, social, and corporate contexts (from a 
prospective mega off shore project in Tanzania 
and ongoing off shore oil extraction in Brazil to 
hydroelectric power generation in Turkey).
In Tanzania, Equinor has for several years 
been on the brink of making its largest overseas 
investment ever. While the fi nal investment de-
cision is expected but not yet realized, the cor-
poration has, as Siri Lange explains, maneuvered 
itself as well as possible relative to authorities, 
local communities, and workers in a context 
of Tanzania being one of the most important 
recipients of Norwegian aid throughout many 
decades. Equinor made the unique decision to 
actively encourage and support the formation 
of a local union branch among its Tanzanian 
employees and “with the involvement of the 
Norwegian union” has involved them in a logic 
of training and encouragement reminiscent of 
the social interaction structured by the political 
economy of aid.
Moving to another of Equinor’s major for-
eign operations, the case from Brazil tells a very 
diff erent story from the one in Tanzania. Iselin 
Strønen shows how, in order to get their license 
to operate very profi table off shore operations in 
Brazil, Equinor has had to comply with Brazil-
ian state requirements to fund and operate CSR 
projects. Th is case study explores in detail one 
such project in which poor fi sherwomen are be-
ing trained and empowered to pursue alterna-
tive livelihoods and interact with political and 
public institutions, and traces the involvement 
of Brazilian state institutions and consultan-
cy-NGOs and their ideologies. Th at this project 
received the internal reward for the best CSR 
project in Equinor in 2016 is a paradox given 
Equinor’s high ambitions and the Norwegian 
state’s expectations concerning CSR as well as 
the fact that this was one of very few Equinor 
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CSR projects that was not voluntary and that 
they did not design themselves.
In the case study of Statkraft  in Turkey, Ståle 
Knudsen and his co-authors consider, through 
a multi-sited approach, how the corporation 
manages one of its hydropower projects in Tur-
key by employing various standards. Tasked by 
its owner—the Norwegian state—to primarily 
pursue profi t and guided only by very general 
expectations concerning CSR, Statkraft  has se-
lected to apply the performance standards of 
the International Finance Corporation, while 
they report (as required by the state) accord-
ing to GRI standards. However, use of these 
standards is fl exible and pragmatic, and in the 
process, “stories” become as important for re-
porting as standards, while the heterogeneous 
and disjointed CSR fi eld in Statkraft  is tenu-
ously held together by the enigmatic fi gure of 
the stakeholder.
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 1. See, e.g., debate in Social Anthropology 20 (1)–
21 (1).
 2. Th ere are also other approaches: see Hilgers 
(2011) for an overview; see Waquant (2012) for 
an approach informed by Bourdieu.
 3. One important example: with new energy leg-
islation in 1991 the electricity sector in Norway 
was the fi rst to deregulate in Europe (Agnell and 
Brekke 2011; Herning 2009; Nilsen and Th ue 
2006). 
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 4. Sweden had from an early date much more 
private capital and “remained thoroughly cap-
italist, exhibiting one of the highest levels of 
concentrated and family capital ownership in 
the world” (Ingham 2011: 188), with around 
fi ft een families controlling 70 percent of the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange (Lie 2016: 924). 
 5. Same level as in Russia and China. France and 
Italy: 10 percent; Germany: 2 percent; UK: in-
signifi cant (Meld. St. 27 2013–2014: 31, 36, 37). 
Th ese numbers exclude the so-called Oil Funds: 
Government Pension Fund Norway and Gov-
ernment Pension Fund Global (the latter valued 
at 1 billion euros in February 2019). 
 6. For the Kings Bay aff air, see https://en.wikipe
dia.org/wiki/Kings_Bay_Aff air.
 7. For an overview (in Norwegian) of these docu-
ments, see: “Statlig eierskap: Publikasjoner.” 




 8. Th is depiction ignores the Norwegian shipping 
sector, which has long been internationally ac-
tive, but has not made signifi cant investments 
abroad. 
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